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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In docket number 38325, Woodrow John Grant timely appeals from the district 
court's order revoking probation, wherein the district court executed the previously 
imposed unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, upon Mr. Grant's plea of 
guilty to aggravated battery. In docket number 38326, Mr. Grant timely appeals from 
the district court's judgment of conviction, wherein the district court imposed a unified 
sentence of five years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Grant's guilty plea to possession 
of a controlled substance. In docket number 38327, Mr. Grant timely appeals from the 
district court's unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, upon Mr. Grant's 
guilty plea to domestic battery. Additionally, Mr. Grant filed a timely I.C.R. 35 motion in 
all of the preceding cases, from which Mr. Grant timely appeals. 
On appeal, Mr. Grant argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due 
process of law when it refused to augment the record with the transcript of his retained 
jurisdiction review hearing. Additionally, Mr. Grant argues that the district court erred 
when it refused to grant his motion to withdraw. Mr. Grant also argues that the district 
court erred when it included a victim impact statement over Mr. Grant's objection. 
Mr. Grant also argues that the district court imposed an unduly harsh sentence when it 
ordered his sentences in the docket numbers 38326 and 38327 to run consecutively 
with his sentence in docket number 38325. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Grant was in a fight and being attacked by four or five guys, when he fired a 
gun into the ground. (Tr., p.61, L.s.4-18.) The bullet ricocheted and struck a person in 
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the leg. (Tr., p.61, L.s.4-18.) Mr. Grant was charged with aggravated battery. (R. Vol. 
I, pp.72-73.) Mr. Grant pleaded guilty to aggravated battery, and the district court 
imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. 
(R., Vol. I, pp.122-124.) Thereafter, the district court suspended Mr. Grant's sentence, 
and placed him on probation. (R., Vol. I, Ls.126-27.) 
After a period of probation, Mr. Grant was charged in a new criminal case, with 
possession of a controlled substance. (R., Vol. II, pp.211-12.) The State then filed 
another criminal action against Mr. Grant, and charged him with domestic battery, 
aggravated assault, unlawful possession of a firearm, and a firearm enhancement. 
(R., Vol. II, pp.344-47.) Mr. Grant's probation officer also filed a report of probation 
violation based partially on the preceding criminal charges. (R., Vol. I, pp.130-131.) 
During plea negations, a plea agreement was set in place and Mr. Grant 
tentatively accepted the State's offer. (Tr., p.119, L.24 - p.120, L.1.) Mr. Grant decided 
to reject the State's offer after learning that the State would not agree to a binding I.C.R. 
11 plea agreement. (Tr., p.120, Ls.1-16.) 
Mr. Grant's defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel based on an 
alleged breakdown in attorney client relationship stemming from Mr. Grant's rejection of 
the State's plea agreement. (R. Vol. II, pp.230-31.) In that motion, defense counsel 
made the following assertions: 
1. The Defendant has insisted upon pursuing an objective that the 
undersigned considers imprudent and unreasonable. 
2. The Defendant had previously agreed to settle this matter and 
accept the State's offer and has now rescinded that offer. 
3. The Defendant has stated that the undersigned counsel has not 
adequately and competently represented his interests. 
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4. The relationship between the Defendant and the undersigned 
counsel has become adversarial and the Defendant has [indicated] 
he wants new counsel to advise him in this case. 
(R. Vol. II, pp.230-31.) A hearing was held on that motion, where defense counsel 
asserted that attorney client communication had broken down and no further 
communications could occur. (Tr., p.120. Ls.5-10; Tr., p.121, Ls.14-15.; Tr., p.124, 
Ls.18-20.) The district court asked Mr. Grant if he wanted to be appointed with new 
counsel, and Mr. Grant said yes. (Tr., p.123, L.25 - p.122, L.2.) The State agreed with 
defense counsel and did not object to the motion. (Tr., p.122, L.4 - p.123, L.13.) The 
district court then orally pronounced its decision to deny the motion. (Tr., p:124, LS.5-
14.) In response, defense counsel requested to address the district court, and made 
the following statement: 
I think communication has [broken] down. I don't think I can communicate 
with him. 
(Tr., p.124, Ls.15-20.) The district court reaffirmed its decision to deny the motion and 
in doing so said that Mr. Grant had caused the breakdown in communication, and that 
Mr. Grant would have to "figure out how to communicate" with defense counsel. 
(Tr., p.124, L.21-p.125, L.4.) The district court then set the matter for trial. (Tr., p.125, 
Ls.13-16.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Grant pleaded guilty to possession of a 
controlled substance, domestic battery, and admitted to the probation violation 
allegations. (Tr., p.129, L.17 - p.130, L.8.) In return, the State agreed to dismiss the 
remaining charges, and agreed to recommend that the sentences in the three cases run 
concurrently. (Tr., p.130, L.8 - p.131, L.14.) 
At the probation violation disposition hearing, defense counsel filed a motion and 
objected to the admission of the victim impact statements because they commented 
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about what would constitute an appropriate sentence. (R. Vol. II, pp.387-392; 
Tr., p.157, L.12 - p.167, L.5.) The district court partially granted defense counsel's 
objection in regard to two of the statements. (Tr., p.159, L.15 - p.163, L.17.) The 
district court stated that it would consider the letters, but it would "strike or redact ... 
portions, if any, that are characterization and opinions about the crime of the defendant 
or the appropriate sentence, [and will] only consider those portions [t)hat are allowed by 
case law." (Tr., p.162, Ls.12-20; Tr., p.21, L.21-p.17.)1 
Thereafter, the district court revoked Mr. Grant's probation and executed the 
previously imposed unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed. (R. Vol. I, 
pp.149-50.) The district court imposed and executed a unified sentence of five years, 
with two years fixed, for Mr. Grant's plea to possession of a controlled substance. 
(R. Vol. II, p.273.) The district court imposed and executed a unified sentence of ten 
years, with five years fixed, for Mr. Grant's plea to domestic battery. (R. Vol. II, pp.398-
99.) Additionally, the two new sentences were ordered to run concurrently with each 
other, but were ordered to run consecutively to Mr. Grant's prior sentence from the 
aggravated battery case. (R. Vol., I, pp.149-50; R. Vol. II, pp.273, 399.) 
On the same day that the sentencing hearing was held, July 8,2010, Mr. Grant 
filed an /.C.R. 35 motion requesting leniency in the three cases. 2 (R. Vol. I, pp.146-154; 
1 The district court never redacted the portions of these two letters it did not consider. 
Accordingly, a motion to augment has been filed concurrency herewith, wherein 
appellate counsel requests augmentation with redacted versions of these letters. 
2 Filing the I.C.R. 35 motion on the same day as the sentencing hearing tolled the forty 
two day time period to file a notice of appeal. The pertinent provision of I.AR. 14(a), 
states "The time for an appeal from any criminal judgment, order or sentence in an 
action is terminated by the filing of a motion with fourteen (14) days of the entry of 
judgment which, if granted, could affect the judgment, order or sentence in the action, in 
which case the appeal period for the judgment and sentence commences to run upon 
the date of the clerk's filing stamp on the order deciding such motion." In State v. 
4 
R. Vol. II, pp.277-78, 402-03.) The district court denied Mr. Grant's I.C.R. 35 motion, 
and Mr. Grant timely appealed. (R. Vol. I, pp.155-60; R. Vol. II, pp.279-84, 405-10.) 
On appeal, Mr. Grant's appellate counsel filed a motion to augment and suspend 
the briefing schedule, wherein appellate counsel requested that the record on appeal be 
augmented with the transcript of the October 20, 2006, jurisdictional review hearing. 
(Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support 
Thereof, (hereinafter, Motion to Augment), pp.1-6.) The State objected to the Motion to 
Augment. (Objection to "Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and 
Statement in Support Thereof," (hereinafter, Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.1-4.) 
Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court denied the Motion to Augment. (Order Denying 
Motion to Augment and Suspend the Briefing Schedule (hereinafter, Order Denying 
Motion to Augment), p.1.) 
Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 540 (Ct. App, 1992) it was held that an I.C.R. 35 motion does 
extend the time for filing an appeal under this provision. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Grant due process and equal protection 
when it denied his Motion to Augment with the transcript of the jurisdictional 
review hearing? 
2. Did the district court err when it failed to grant defense counsel's motion to 
withdraw? 
3. Did the district court error in err when it admitted the victim's impact statement? 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ordered Mr. Grant's sentence in 
the 2005 case to run consecutively with the sentences in the 2009 cases? 
5. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Grant's Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of Sentence in light of Mr. Grant's 




The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Grant Due Process And Equal Protection When It 
Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Transcript Of The Jurisdictional 
Review Hearing 
A. Introduction 
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause and equal protection clause to deny an 
indigent defendant access to transcripts of trial proceedings which are relevant to issues 
the defendant intends to raise on appeal. The only way a state can constitutionally 
preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested transcript is if the State can prove 
that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal. 
In this case, Mr. Grant filed Motion to Augment, requesting a transcript of the 
October 20, 2010, jurisdictional review hearing, wherein he argued that, when 
evaluating a motion to revoke probation, a district court can considered all of the 
hearings before and after sentencing. Mr. Grant asserts that the jurisdictional review 
hearing occurred after sentencing and since Mr. Grant commented on his own behalf, 
that hearing is relevant to the issues addressed at the probation violation disposition 
hearing, and this Court erred in denying his request. 
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B. The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Grant Due Process And Equal Protection 
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Transcript Of The 
Jurisdictional Review Hearing 
1. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Grant With 
Access To The Requested Transcript, Has Denied Him Due Process 
Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate Review Of His 
Sentencing Claims 
The constitutions of both United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a 
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; 10. CONST. art. 
I, §13. 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Cole 
v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servo of Durham Cly., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981 ). 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United 
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh V. State, 
Dept. of Health and Welfare ex reI. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998) (citing 
Smith v. Idaho Dep't of Correction, 128 Idaho 768, 771 (1996)). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See 
I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript, 
the cost of such transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); 
I.C. § 19-863(a). Idaho court rules also address this issue. I.C.R. 5.2 mandates the 
production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant. I.CR. 5.2(a). 
Further, "[tJranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court .. 
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· ." Id. I.C.R. 54.7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript to be prepared at 
county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as provided by statute 
or law." I.C.R.54.7(a). 
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment 
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852 
(Ct. App. 1983) (citing to I.A.R. 11). 
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly 
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can 
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the 
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these 
cases. The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal 
protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent 
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second 
theme limits the states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for 
review. The states do not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they 
request. In order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal 
protection, the states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless 
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous. 
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. fIIinois 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
In that case, two indigent defendant's "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a 
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the 
proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State 
of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to 
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death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts 
themselves. Id. at 14. The sale question before the United States Supreme Court was 
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants 
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16. 
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, 
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due 
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with 
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of 
justice in every American court.'" Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty 
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold as 
follows: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their 
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois 
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious 
discriminations. 
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional 
mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be 
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At 
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary 
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20. 
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In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding 
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court 
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. In 
that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of 
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Burns, 360 U.S. at 257. The United States 
Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to 
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access 
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. "This principle is no less 
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase 
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of 
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id. 
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a 
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under 
the present standard, ... , they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of 
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their 
appeaL" Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement 
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is 
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the 
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the 
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such 
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for 
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The 
Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendant's could not be 
11 
adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial 
proceedings. Id. at 497-99. 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U. S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections 
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to 
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on 
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument 
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. at 195. If the State 
wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the 
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id. 
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Idaho Court of Appeals. See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. 
Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); state v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 
2007). 
Here, an application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a 
situation analogous to the facts of Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863). In that case, a 
transcript was necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed 
without the transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly in Idaho, an appellant must 
provide an adequate record or the appeal can be dismissed. "It is well established that 
an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate 
court can review the merits of the claims of error, '" and where pertinent portions of the 
record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial 
court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 
416,422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103,105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. 
Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541 
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(Ct. App. 1992». If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes, 
that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's] claim is possible, 
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[edJ that appellate counsel 
not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's 
review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). If Mr. Grant fails to 
provide the appellate court with the requested item, the legal presumption will apply and 
Mr. Grant's claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action alone, 
which prevents him from access to the requested items, then such action is a violation 
of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer apply. 
Moreover, without the requested item there is no way to establish that Mr. Grant 
provided new and additional information in support of his I.C.R. 35 motion. At the 
/.C.R. 35 hearing, the district court denied Mr. Grant's I.C.R. 35 motion because of his 
failure to provide new or additional information. (Tr., p.221, L.23 - p.222, L24.) New or 
additional information must be provided by a defendant in order for an Idaho appellate 
court to review an appeal from an I.C.R. 35 motion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201 
(2007). Without a transcript of the requested item, there is no wayan Idaho appellate 
court can determine whether the information provided in support of Mr. Grant's I.C.R. 35 
motion was new or additional. 
Additionally, the requested items are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of 
review. Transcripts of the various probation violation admission and dispositional 
hearings are relevant because Idaho appellate courts review ALL proceedings following 
sentencing when determining whether the court appropriately revoked probation. See 
state v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26,28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that 
is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire 
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record encompassing events before and after the original judgment. We base our 
review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events 
occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." (emphasis 
added)). 
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both 
due process and equal protection under to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial 
proceedings on appeal. The decision to deny Mr. Grant's Motion to Augment will render 
his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcript supports 
the district court's order revoking his probation. This functions as a procedural bar to 
the review of Mr. Grant's appellate sentencing claims on the merits, and therefore, 
Mr. Grant should either be provided with the requested transcript or the presumption 
should not be applied. 
2. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Grant With 
Access To The Requested Transcript Has Denied Him Due Process 
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal 
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme Court reasoned 
that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricable related to due process that the 
denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The 
Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell "the necessity of counsel was 
so vital and imperative that the failure to make an effective appointment of counsel was 
likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ... 
[toJ hold otherwise would to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to, 'that 
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there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free 
government which no member of the Union may disregard.'" Id. at 71-72. 
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, (1963), the United States Supreme Court 
relied on Griffin, supra, and is progeny and determined that the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendant's the 
right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of 
Douglas was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. 
According to the United State Supreme Court: 
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel 
on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant has a right to 
counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it comprehended the right to 
effective assistance of counsel. 
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397. 
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the 
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious 
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,744 (1967) held that the constitutional requirements 
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an 
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he 
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127 
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack of access to the requested 
transcript has prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of 
the case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether 
there is an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor 
of any argument made or either undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Grant has 
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not obtained review of the trial proceedings based on the merits and was not provided 
with effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor. 
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the starting point of evaluating 
whether counsel renders effective assistance of counsel in a criminal action is the 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMNAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION. 
These standards still offer insight into the role and responsibilities of appellate counsel. 
Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state: 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence .... Counsel should 
advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
Standard 4-8.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcript, counsel neither 
can make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal, 
nor can counsel consider all issues that might affect the district court's decision to 
revoke Mr. Grant's probation. Counsel is also unable to advise Mr. Grant on the 
probable role the transcript may play in the appeal. 
Mr. Grant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and 
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to all of the relevant 
transcripts. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Grant's constitutional 
right to due process which includes a right to the effective assistance of counsel in this 
appeal. Accordingly, counsel should be provided with access to the requested 
transcript and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental 
briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review. 
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II. 
The District Court Erred When It Failed To Grant Defense Counsel's Motion To 
Withdraw 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Grant asserts that the district court erred in denying defense counsel's 
motion to withdraw as counsel, and thereby forced both defense counsel and Mr. Grant 
to accept, against both their wills, that defense counsel remain as Mr. Grant's court 
appointed attorney. Mr. Grant submits two separate arguments with regard to the 
foregoing assertion of error. The first argument is that the district court did not 
adequately inquire into Mr. Grant's reasoning for his request for new counsel. 
Additionally, the district court did not adequately inquire into the actual nature of the 
alleged conflict. Secondly and assuming, arguendo, that the district court's inquiry was 
adequate, Mr. Grant argues the district court failed to apply the appropriate legal 
standards when making its is decision. Mr. Grant specifically argues, that the district 
court inappropriately focused on defense counsel's legal capabilities as opposed to the 
nature of the alleged breakdown in the attorney client relationship. 
B. Standard Of Review 
To determine if the court conducted an adequate inquiry into reasons why 
substitute counsel should have been appointed and whether a person wishes to reject 
the court appointed counsel and self-represent, should be reviewed de novo. See 
State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 711 (et. App. 1997). An abuse of discretion standard is used 
when reviewing the question of whether the trial court should have appointed substitute 
counsel. State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 11 (Ct. App. 1995). 
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C. The District Court Erred When It Failed To Grant Defense Counsel's Motion To 
Withdraw 
1. The District Court Inadequately Inquired Into Both Defense Counsel's And 
Mr. Grant's Requests For Substitute Counsel 
"The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 
of the Idaho Constitution guarantee the right to counsel." State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 
586, 594 (Ct. App. 2007). "It is well settled that an indigent's right to court-appointed 
counsel includes the right to effective assistance of counsel, but it does not necessarily 
include the right to an attorney of one's own choice." Priest, 128 Idaho at 11. 
"However, for 'good cause' a trial court may, in its discretion, appoint a substitute 
attorney for an indigent defendant." Lippert, 145 Idaho at 594. "An accused also has 
the right to waive court-appointed counsel and to conduct his or her own defense." Id. 
"A defendant is not required to show good cause for the desire to exercise that right." Id. 
"The trial court must afford the defendant a full and fair opportunity to present the facts 
and reasons in support of a motion for substitution of counsel after having been made 
aware of the problems involved." Id. (emphasis in original). This inquiry must occur 
even if the district court has "well-founded suspicions of intentional delay and 
manipulative tactics" there can be "no substitute for the inquires necessary to protect a 
defendant's constitutional rights." Peck, 130 Idaho at 714. 
In State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 898 (1980), the Idaho Supreme Court found 
that this duty was satisfied when the trial court asked the defendant to make any 
statements he desired in support of his motion for substitute counsel. Conversely, in 
Peck, supra, this duty was not satisfied when the Mr. Peck was not allowed to address 
the court concerning his desire for substitute trial counsel. Peck 130 Idaho at 713-14. 
In coming to that conclusion, the Idaho Court of Appeals reasoned as follows: 
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As [Mr. Peck] points out, this Court cannot discern whether he had 
legitimate grounds for his request for new counsel, such as an actual 
conflict of interest or a deficiency in the public defenders' performance. 
Nor can we ascertain from the record whether Peck wished to represent 
himself, as was his right, in preference to continuing with representation 
by the appointed counsel. The record reveals no reason for summarily 
rejecting [Mr. Peck's] request, as the district court appears to have done. 
Id. at 714. 
In this case, the district court failed to provide Mr. Grant with a full and fair 
opportunity to address the court concerning his desires for substitute counsel. As noted 
above, there was a hearing on the motion to withdraw. At that hearing, all the parties 
were in agreement that the motion to withdraw should be granted. Initially, defense 
counsel stated the breakdown in the attorney client relationship stemmed from a 
disagreement over a plea agreement. (Tr., p.119, L.24 - p.120, L.16.) Mr. Grant would 
not accept the plea agreement because it was not a binding I.C.R. 11 agreement, and 
the State was not willing to offer such an agreement. (Tr., p.119, L.24 - p.120, L.16.) 
Trial counsel then stated: 
Your Honor, I felt like that our communication had [broken] down. 
thought that maybe if he had new counsel - - because the communication 
had broke down and become averse, that maybe new counsel could give 
him a new look at this. 
(Tr., p.120, Ls.5-10.) Defense counsel then said that he had a fundamental 
disagreement with Mr. Grant over the plea agreement. (Tr., p.120, L.21 - p.121, L.1.) 
Defense counsel also stated: 
[At] his election, Your Honor, he wants to set this for further proceedings, 
get new counsel, and maybe if he had new counsel, and maybe there 
might be something else they can negotiate with the State maybe there is 
something they could work out, but if nothing else, I think he probably 
needs new counsel. 
If he gets a fresh look at it, maybe they can give another insight ... and 
maybe something can be worked out. I'm not sure, Your Honor, but at this 
point in time, I think the communications broke down and we're adverse. 
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(Tr., p.121, LS.2-15 (emphasis added». The district court asked Mr. Grant if he wanted 
new counsel, and Mr. Grant said that he did want new counsel. (Tr., p.121, L.25 -
p.122, L.2.) 
The State then mentioned that indigent defendants do not have a right to the 
attorney of their choosing. (Tr., p.122, Ls.4-S.) The State went on note: 
In this case, they appointed [defense counsel] and [defense counsel] is a 
fine attorney; however, I think there are expectations and situations and 
[defense counsel] put in his motion that their relationship is adversarial. 
(Tr., p.122, Ls.10-14.) The State also asserted: 
[U]ltimately, I think based upon what is in the motion, the Court should 
appoint a new attorney. 
(Tr., p.122, Ls.21-23.) The State then reiterated this point: 
Now, I don't think I have an objection. [Defense counsel] put good 
grounds in here, and we want this system to go on and be fair .... 
(Tr., p.123, Ls.11-13.) Throughout the preceding dialogue defense counsel, the State, 
and Mr. Grant all agreed that the motion to withdraw should be granted. 
The district court denied the motion based on its view that defense counsel was 
very capable, but never directly addressed the substance of the alleged conflict. The 
district court's reasoning follows: 
Mr. Grant, you've got one of the better criminal defense attorneys here in 
town, and I'm not sure why you would want a new attorney. You may 
have a disagreement with regards to what he believes is in your best 
interest, but he has a duty to represent you from his perspective in 
reviewing the case and presenting all your options. 
Now, if your objection is that you want to go to trial, I wouldn't think that 
[defense counsel1 would be - - there isn't any better person to go to trial 
with than [defense counsel]. So I have a hard time releasing [defense 
counsel] from this case just because you have had a disagreement over 
what he believes is in your best interest. 
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So, I'm not inclined to grant this motion to allow [defense counsel] to 
withdraw from this case. If you want a trial, we'll set it for a trial. 
(Tr., p.123, L.14 - p.124, L.8.) The district court denied the motion, and then defense 
counsel then asked the district court if he could speak. (Tr., p.124, Ls.13-16.) The 
district court granted this request and defense counsel stated: 
I think communication has [broken] down. I don't think I can communicate 
with [Mr. Grant]. 




I don't think it's your fault.3 
I Understand. 
That's Mr. Grant. He is going to have to figure 
out how to communicate with you and work this 
out because I don't see how - - just because 
you have a difference of opinion or anything 
like that, you can't represent him like you 
always have. 
I don't have any doubt you are a capable 
attorney ... and you've been through these 
things before. You're able to represent his 
best interest and proceed to trial if you need to, 
aren't you? 
3 The district court's factual finding that Mr. Grant caused the breakdown in 
communication is clearly erroneous because it is not supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. On appeal, "[f]indings are clearly erroneous only when 
unsupported by substantial and competent evidence." State v. Kinser, 141 Idaho 557, 
560 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing to State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho 682, 686 (Ct. App. 1999) . 
Idaho appellate courts will overturn a district court's factual findings if they are clearly 
erroneous. (see State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 73, 75 (2000). Since, the district court 
never asked either defense counselor Mr. Grant why there was a breakdown in 
communication and since the district court never actually obtained any testimony or 
other form of evidence pertaining to the actual nature of the conversation which led to 
the breakdown in attorney client relationship, there is no evidence that the alleged 
conflict was Mr. Grant's fault. Accordingly, the preceding factual findings they should be 
deemed clearly erroneous and disregarded. 
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(Tr., p.124, L.21 - p.125, L.9.) Defense counsel never answered that question and just 
asked the court to set the matter for trial if it decided to deny the motion to withdraw, 
which it did. (Tr., p.125, Ls.10-16.) 
The district court never asked Mr. Grant to explain why he wanted new counsel 
appointed. The district court only asked Mr. Grant if he wanted the appointment of new 
counsel. (Tr., p.121, L.25 - 122, L.2.) Mr. Grant then answered, "Yes, Your Honor." 
(Tr. p.i L.2.) Immediately after Mr. Grant answered, the district court then asked the 
State to comment on the motion to withdraw. (Tr., p.i22, L.3.) At no time during that 
hearing was Mr. Grant asked to explain why he wanted substitute counsel appointed. 
While defense counsel was provided with an opportunity to explain why he filed the 
motion to withdraw and explain the nature of the conflict from his perspective, no such 
opportunity was afforded to Mr. Grant. It is worth noting that in defense counsel's 
motion to withdraw Mr. Grant was blamed for the conflict. In that motion, it was 
asserted that: 
5. The Defendant has insisted upon pursuing an objective that the 
undersigned considers imprudent and unreasonable. 
6. The Defendant had previously agreed to settle this matter and 
accept the State's offer and has now rescinded that offer. 
7. The Defendant has stated that the undersigned counsel has not 
adequately and competently represented his interests. 
8. The relationship between the Defendant and the undersigned 
counsel has become adversarial and the Defendant has [indicated1 
he wants new counsel to advise him in this case. 
(R. Vol. II, pp.230-31.) At the withdrawal hearing, the district court also held that the 
conflict was attributable to Mr. Grant and not trial counsel. (Tr., p.124, L.i8 - p.125, 
L.4.) Mr. Grant was not able to articulate his side of the conflict. This is important 
because both defense counsel and the State agreed that Mr. Grant and defense 
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counsel had an adversarial relationship. (Tr., p.121, Ls.14-15; Tr., p.122, L.4 - p.123, 
L.13.) Had the district court asked Mr. Grant questions, he might have concluded that 
trial counsel was pressuring Mr. Grant, or that trial counsel's performance, was 
deficient, or that there was no conflict. Moreover, there is no way to tell if Mr. Grant 
wished to represent himself. 
In addition to the foregoing error, the district court's duty was not satisfied 
because it never inquired into the actual nature of the alleged conflict. As mentioned in 
the motion to withdraw, the conflict was triggered by Mr. Grant's refusal to accept the 
State's plea agreement. (R. Vol. /I, pp.230-31.) At the withdrawal hearing, defense 
counsel stated that Mr. Grant did not want to accept the plea agreement because the 
State was not willing to offer a binding I.C.R. 11 agreement. (Tr., p.119, L.24. - p.120, 
L.16.) While this adequately identified the event which triggered the breakdown in the 
attorney client relationship, defense counsel did not describe the exact nature of the 
conflict. Mr. Grant argues to constitute an adequate inquiry the district court needed to 
explore the actual content of the conversations which lead to the breakdown of attorney 
client communication.4 There is no indication whether defense counselor Mr. Grant 
were acting hostile toward one another. The record does not reflect whether the alleged 
conflict was merely over tactics or had escalated to the point that they were attacking 
each other personally. 
In sum, the district court did hold a withdrawal hearing. However, Mr. Grant was 
never afforded the opportunity to explain the reasons why he wanted substitute counsel 
appointed. Additionally, defense counsel explained the reasons why he thought that 
4 Appellate counsel suggests that after the State was allowed to comment on the 
motion, it should have been excused from the hearing because this discussion could 
potentially require discloser of privileged attorney client communications. 
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communications had broken down, but the district court never asked about the content 
of the conversations on which defense counsel was relying. In the event this Court 
determines that the district court's inquiry into the alleged conflict was inadequate, the 
appropriate remedy is to remand this matter for further proceedings. Lippett, 145 Idaho 
at 596. 
2. The District Court's Abused Its Discretion When It Ignored Defense 
Counsel's Claim That He Could No Longer Communicate With Mr. Grant 
"The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 
of the Idaho Constitution guarantee the right to counsel." State v. Lippett, 145 Idaho 
586, 594 (Ct. App. 2007). "Upon a showing of good cause a trial court may appoint 
substitute counsel for an indigent, such decision lying within the discretion of the trial 
court. An abuse of discretion will be found if the denial of such a motion results in the 
abridgement of an accused's right to counse!." Priest, 128 Idaho at 11. (citations 
omitted). 
When determining whether good cause exists: 
[TJhe court must make some reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to 
determine the nature of the defendant's complaints and to apprise itself of 
the facts necessary to determine whether the defendant's relationship with 
his or her appointed attorney has deteriorated to the point that sound 
discretion requires substitution or even to such an extent that his or her 
Sixth Amendment right would be violated but for substitution. Even when 
the trial judge suspects that the defendant's requests are disingenuous 
and designed solely to manipulate the judicial process and to delay the 
trial, perfunctory questioning is not sufficient. 
Uppett, 145 Idaho at 596 (citing State v. Vessy, 967 P.2d 960 (Utah Ct. App. 1998») 
(emphasis added). In other words, the question is "whether the defendant-attorney 
conflict was so great that it led to a total lack of communication precluding an adequate 
defense." Id. at 597. (citing United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231, 1250 (10th Cir. 
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2002)). "A defendant may not, however, manufacture good cause by abusive or 
uncooperative behavior. Id. 
The district court applied the wrong legal standard when ruling on the order to 
withdraw. As stated in Lippert, supra, the question is "whether the defendant-attorney 
conflict was so great that it led to a total lack of communication precluding an adequate 
defense." Lippert, 145 Idaho at 597. Here, the district court ignored defense counsel's 
statement that he could not communicate with Mr. Grant, and instead focused on trial 
counsel's competency as a criminal defense attorney. Defense counsel's competency 
is irrelevant because the question is whether defense counsel and Mr. Grant can 
communicate about the goals of representation and if Mr. Grant can aid in his defense. 
In situations where there is no attorney client communications, problems arise 
when it comes to making decisions about the overall objectives of representation. For 
example, Mr. Grant, not defense counsel, needed to decide whether to accept the 
State's plea agreement or go to trial. Preparing for trial becomes very problematic if the 
attorney and the client cannot communicate because Mr. Grant is the only person who 
can make critical decisions, such as whether or not he will testify. Moreover, the lack of 
communication would prevent defense counsel from effectively preparing Mr. Grant to 
testify if that was his decision. In making these decisions, Mr. Grant needed to be 
informed by his attorney about the benefits and risks. However, without communication, 
defense counsel could not help Mr. Grant in that risk assessment, which is an essential 
component of a competent defense. Without being able to communicate with Mr. Grant, 
defense counsel was unable to perform his function. Defense counsel's skill as a 
criminal defense attorney cannot overcome this barrier to effective assistance of 
counsel. 
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In denying the motion to withdraw, the district court abused its discretion when it 
ignored the communication breakdown between Mr. Grant and defense counsel and 
focused on defense counsel's competency as a criminal defense attorney. Finally, 
since good cause was shown, and the district court abused its discretion in denying a 
request for substitute counsel, Mr. Grant is entitled to the vacation of his sentence and a 
reinstatement of his trial rights. See Lippert 145 Idaho at 597. 
III. 
The District Court Erred When It Admitted The Victim's Impact Statement 
A. Introduction 
Victim impact statements are admissible at sentencing but are subject to 
limitations. One of those limitations prohibits the admission of statements that address 
the character of the defendant, opinions about the crime, and opinions about the 
appropriate sentence. In this case, the district court struck some statements based on 
the aforementioned rules. However, over defense counsel's objection, the district court 
admitted statements made by the victim which contained the same type of statements it 
had just ruled inadmissible. 
B. Standard Of Review 
State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 573 (2008), holds that the admission of victim 
impact statements is reviewed for harmless error. The Idaho Supreme Court noted: 
Id. 
The test to determine harmless error is whether there is a reasonable 
possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the 
conviction, and the court must be able to declare a belief that it was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt[.] To hold error harmless, the Court 
'must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no 
reasonable possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the 
conviction.' 
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C. The District Court Erred When It Admitted The Victim's ImQact Statement 
Article I, Section 22(6) of the Idaho Constitution, provides that the victim of a 
crime has the right "to be heard, upon request, at all criminal justice proceedings 
considering a plea of guilty, sentencing, incarceration or release of the defendant, 
unless manifest injustice would result." See also I.C. § 19-5306(1)(e). However, 
"[v]ictim impact evidence provides only two types of information: (1) it describes the 
characteristics of the victim and the emotional impact of the crime on the family; and (2) 
it sets forth the family members' opinions and characterizations of the crime and the 
defendant." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 573 (2008) (citations omitted). "[W]hile 
evidence relating to the victim's personal characteristics and the impact of the crime on 
the murder victim's family is admissible, characterizations and opinions about the crime, 
the defendant and the appropriate sentence are not admissible." Id. Nevertheless, 
although certain types of victim impact evidence are admissible, if victim impact 
evidence is introduced that is "so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial 
fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a 
mechanism for relief." Id. citing to Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991). 
In reliance on the preceding authority, Mr. Grant's trial counsel filed a motion to 
either strike or seal the victim's impact statement, arguing that the victim's impact 
statement "contains improper characterizations and opinions about the defendant; and 
opinions about the sentence the defendant should receive; and references to unproven 
and unfounded hearsay allegations about prior bad-acts evidence by the defendant." 
(R. Vol. II, pp.391-92.) This motion was argued, and the district court considered the 
victim's impact statement in its entirety. (Tr. p.165, L.8 - p.167, L.5.) The victim's 
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impact statement contains the following statements which were based unsubstantiated 
prior bad acts: 
[Mr. Grant] ripped a phone out of my hand, and then pushed me down as 
hard as he could, all the while calling me names. 
(2010, PSI, p.1?) 
An example of this and losing out on a lifelong experience is on my Prom 
night. ... Anyways, we couldn't go to my high school for the dance 
because [Mr. Grant] was a violent felon so he would take me to my 
favorite restaurant instead. I fixed up and we went to Johnny Carinos and 
had a wonderful dinner. (One thing you leam with [Mr. Grant] though is if 
something is going well, he will sabotage it.) Well, we were on our way 
back home and I told him I wanted to go out with him and hang out with 
some friends from prom as well. He didn't like that at all because he 
wanted me to stay home and do what he wanted to do. It escalated from 
there and I told him I was going to go out and he could choose to come 
and be a good sport or stay home. So he forced me out of the car and I 
walked from by [sic] his house to the closest gas station in my dress and 
high heels. Not bad enough? He followed me in his car, acted like he 
was going to run me over, laughed when it scared me, and then 
immediately afterward called me a name and threw a beer bottle aimed at 
my head. It shattered the glass on the passenger side of his truck and 
glass shards flew all over me, in a Prom dress, with him out of his truck 
now inside the gas station humiliating me in front of everyone. "You guys 
see this girl, she's nothing but a whore" was one of the comments but the 
other one I remember loud and clear to this day is "It's alright. Nobody 
would want you and your ugly-ass stretch marks" 
(2010 PSI, p.1B.) 
I have countless stories I could share with you, but I wonder what it would 
take to convince a judge that this man is not a nice person, and that he is 
in fact dangerous, and should be put away for a long time .... [Mr. Grant] 
called me things like whore, slut, cu*t, loose, ugly, worthless, calling me a 
bitch or a baby when I would cry, telling me he hates me or is going to 
suffocate me with a pillow while I'm asleep, or make me watch while he 
kills my dad and see "daddy's eyes glaze over" ? [sic] Or what about the 
countless times he would stalk me, throw things at my head, rip up any of 
our memorabilia, humiliate me in public, shove me, spit in my face, make 
me cry .... 
(2010 PSI, p.18.) 
I will continue with one more incident, an incident that I wish I would have 
reported but didn't. In August of 'OB, we had been broken up and he was 
trying to get me to come over and hang out with him. He talked me into it 
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so I met up with him and he picked me up to go to his friend's house. It so 
happened that I saw a guy there, heavy-set and unattractive, that I used to 
work with and I sat next to him and started talking. [Mr. Grant] because 
very jealous (this what he did with ANY guy I talked to) and made enough 
of a scene that the guyf,] who's house we were atL] told him to knock it off. 
So instead [Mr. Grant] just quieted down and started pinching my back 
really hard, telling me I was sitting to close to this guy. He kept doing it 
until he pinched me so hard I cried out in pain and told him I wanted to 
leave. So he followed me outside and as I was telling him to just take me 
back to my car, he grabbed my neck and started choking me. 
This night has faded a lot, such as I don't remember all of the details but I 
still remember vividly the fear I felt right then and feeling of not being able 
to breathe from someone cutting off my air passage .... After that, I tried 
to run and he chased after me. I was pounding on a neighbor's door, 
praying that someone would answer and help me, not no one was there to 
help me that night. He caught up to me and proceeded to choke me 
again, all while going through my phone and literally dragging me by the 
neck. I couldn't breathe so I couldn't keep up with him and he finally 
realized that and loosened up his grip long enough for me to cough 
uncontrollably and get to the car. He never once let go of my neck, and 
that walk from the house I had ran to, to [sic] his car was the longest walk 
of my life. He forced me into the car with me kicking him and screaming 
for help, and he had a look in his eyes like the devil had taken over. I 
knew that if something didn't change he had every intention of killing me. 
He made me drive because he knew I'd escape if he got out long enough 
to go to the driver side door. He still had me by the neck after we got 
situated and told me to drive to Arbon Valley. When I asked him why we 
were going out there all he said was "I think you know why." I don't 
remember much about the car ride except for my survival instincts kicking 
in, and I know God was with me because I just started talking about Him 
to [Mr. Grant] and slowly he loosened his grip more and more until it was 
like the fire just left him. He said he was sorry but I was still too scared to 
get mad or contradict him so I just agreed with everything he said, and we 
drove back to his place for the night. 
He tried to have sex with me that night, and ! share this only because I 
want you to know how degraded and upset I felt after this had just 
happened and he thought that I would want him to even touch me let 
alone anything else. He kept trying and I just whimpered and kept inching 
away from him until he finally fell asleep. I got up and went to the living 
room, and typed a note into my phone saying "if I'm dead and somebody 
finds this, [Mr. Grant] killed me". [sic] I then called my fried Sierra and was 
whispering, and told her I was at [Mr. Grant's] house, that I was ok and 
would call her tomorrow and tell her everything. The whole reason for 
calling her though, was so if I didn't happen to make it tomorrow, I wanted 
to know where the last place I was so they could tell the police. 
(2010 PSI, pp.18-19.) 
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Also, the fact that when officers questioned him about having a gun it was 
the first question he had 'no comment' and 'I'd like to speak to my 
attorney' seems to me to be incriminating in itself. . .. He knows full well 
he has time over his head and like a snake, he is trying to slither his way 
out of as many issues as possible. I just hope that everyone will be able 
to see through his mind games and manipulation. 
In conclusion, Woody does need help; he needs a lot of help ... in prison. 
He needs to be put away .... 
(2010 PSI, p.19.) 
Woodrow John Grant is someone to be feared, not respected .. " If I 
could have one wish granted though, I would say that ten years fixed is 
more than fair for the trauma he's put me and so many other victims of his 
violence through. I figure if he gets to serve his sentence concurrent and I 
even allowed the gun charges to drop from his plea bargain, he is getting 
a pretty good deal by going away for only ten years. 
(2010 PSI, pp.19-20.) The district court admitted this statement in its entirely. 
(Tr. p.165, L.8 - p.167, L.5.) Similar comments were made at the sentencing/probation 
violation disposition hearing. Defense counsel first objected after the victim stated that 
Mr. Grant pushed, spit, choked, insulted, and humiliated the victim. (Tr., p.189, L.14-
p.190, L.4.) However, the victim continued to make prejudicial statements, which 
follow: 
I believe a life sentence would be more than fair for him knowing what he 
has done to and others but, unfortunately, sometimes things don't work 
out like they should. I would say for the years he put me and other people 
in his life through physical and emotional harm, it is more than fair - - at 
least the maximum penalty give or take. A few fights spitting in my face, 
choking me, calling me filthy names, humiliating me - - and that's not even 
close to how bad it would get - - the maximum penalty is more than fair. 
All I can say is I will not be around when he gets out. That's how much it 
scares me to think of him roaming the streets. It scares me to realize how 
many people know him or were friends with him that he believes he should 
be put away for a long time as well. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I have another objection, Your honor, if the Court 
would just renew it for the record - -
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(Tr., p.192, L.17 - p.193, L.13.) The foregoing contains the type of characterizations 
which are precluded under State v. Payne, supra. The victim commented on what she 
thought would be an appropriate sentence and Mr. Grant's violent and untruthful 
character. 
When Mr. Grant's defense counsel filed the motion to strike the victim's impact 
statement, he also filed another motion to strike or seal victim impact statements made 
by the victim's immediate family members. (R. Vol. II, pp.389-90.) The district court 
partially admitted two of these letters, and redacted all characterizations and opinions 
relating to the crime, the defendant, or the appropriate sentence. (Tr., p.159, L.15 -
p.163, L.17.) In partially admitting these letters, yet fully admitting the victim's impact 
letter, the district court made it clear that it considered all of the statements in the 
victim's impact statement. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the district court did not 
consider the objectionable statements contained in the victim's impact statement. 
Mr. Grant recognizes that State v. Payne, supra, was a death penalty case and 
that prior that opinion the Idaho Court of Appeals issued a series of opinions which drew 
a distinction between the use of victim impact statements in death penalty and non-
death penalty cases. See State v. Grove, 120 Idaho 950,952 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. 
Campbell, 123 Idaho 922, 928 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466, 470 
(Ct. App. 1991). Mr. Grant argues that this distinction is meaningless when viewed in 
light of the policy underpinnings of the State v. Payne. As stated above, State v. Payne 
holds that H[v]ictim impact evidence provides only two types of information: (1) it 
describes the characteristics of the victim and the emotional impact of the crime on the 
family; and (2) it sets forth the family members' opinions and characterizations of the 
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crime and the defendant." Payne, 146 Idaho at 573. According to the Idaho Court of 
Appeals: 
The information conveyed by a victim exercising his or her right to be 
heard serves this purpose by relating the victim's personal characteristics 
and the impact of the murder on the victim's family. Such evidence is 
designed to show the victim's 'uniqueness as an individual human being.' 
The allowance of this information recognizes that 'the State has a 
legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence which the 
defendant is entitled to put in, by reminding the sentencer that just as the 
murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is an 
individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in 
particular to his family.' Victim impact information gives the court 
knowledge that is helpful for determining the proper punishment and 
prevents relegation of the victim to the status of a "faceless stranger." 
State v. Leon, 142 Idaho 705, 709 (Ct. App. 2006) (citations omitted). Since the main 
purpose for the inclusion of victim impact statements is to shed light on the uniqueness 
of the victim, the nature of the defendant's punishment, i.e. death or non-death, is 
irrelevant to this policy. Additionally, victim impact statements are allowed to rebut the 
defenses mitigation evidence. Since the defense can admit mitigating evidence in both 
death and non-death penalty cases, this policy has no relationship with the nature of the 
defendant's sentence. Therefore, the protections contained in State v. Panye, should 
be applied to non-death penalty cases because, none of the policies behind the 
inclusion of victim impact statements are unique to death penalty cases. 
State v. Payne used a due process rationale to limit the content of victim impact 
statements, but did not limit its hold to death penalty cases. As stated above, "if victim 
impact evidence is introduced that is "so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial 
fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a 
mechanism for relief." Payne, 146 Idaho at 573. There is no logical reason why this rule 
should not be applied to non-death penalty sentencing. In fact, this protection is 
consistent with the Court of Appeals opinions in Grove, Campbell and Chapman, supra. 
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For example, Grove, held that "sentencing judge may consider in non-capital cases 
victim impact statements, provided the trial court does not give undue weight to the 
statement whereby the emphasis shifts from the crime to consideration of the 'worth' of 
the victim." Grove, 120 Idaho at 952. This is consistent with State v. Payne, in that, the 
victim impact statements are allowed to provide insight in to the victim and the 
emotional impact caused by the offense. However, the use of victim impact statements 
cannot unfairly shift the focus of the sentencing hearing from the defendant. Since the 
policies in the Court of Appeals cases are the same as the policies in State v. Payne, 
there is no reason to draw a distinction between death and non-death penalty cases. In 
both situations criminal defendants are faced with the loss of significant personal liberty. 
In many non-death penalty cases, defendants are subject to severe penalties such as 
life without parole. 
In sum, victim impact statements are limited to descriptions of the emotional 
impact of the crime on the family and the victim, and cannot contain opinions about the 
defendant, the crime, or the appropriate sentence. The district court recognized the 
foregoing rules when it refused to admit portions of the family members' statements. 
However, the district court went on to admit the same type of statements when they 
were made by the actual victim. In doing so, the district court violated Mr. Grant's due 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Mr. Grant's Prior Sentence In 
The 2005 Case To Run Consecutively To The Sentences In The 2009 Cases 
A. Introduction 
When Mr. Grant was originally sentenced there was no indication that he 
suffered from mental health issues. However, Mr. Grant's mental health issues 
manifested during the period after his originally sentencing and before his probation 
violation disposition hearing. Since mental health issues are recognized as a mitigating 
factor, there was new mitigating information before the district court when it revoked 
Mr. Grant's probation and ordered the sentences in the 2009 cases to run consecutively 
to the sentence from the 2005 case. When this is taken into consideration with the 
other mitigating factors is supports the conclusion that Mr. Grant's sentences are unduly 
harsh. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Mr. Grant's Prior 
Sentence In The 2005 Case To Run Consecutively To The Sentences In The 
2009 Cases 
Mr. Grant asserts that, given any view of the facts, the district court's decision to 
run his unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, in docket number 38325, 
consecutively to his unified sentences of five, with two years fixed, in docket number 
38326, and ten years, with five years fixed, in docket number 38327, is excessive. 
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh 
sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, giving 
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
34 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.'" State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979». Mr. Grant does not allege that his 
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of 
discretion, Mr. Grant must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was 
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 
141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385 (1992». 
The governing criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of 
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. 
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Coass%, 136 
Idaho 138 (2001». 
There are mitigating factors present in this case, which when viewed in light of 
Mr. Grant's sentence, support the conclusion that the district court abused its discretion 
when it ordered his sentences in docket numbers 38356 and 38357 to consecutively to 
his previous sentence, in docket number 38325. Specifically, Mr. Grant's mental health 
is a mitigating factor. In State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 569-70 (2008), the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that even in instances where there is no nexus between a crime 
and the mental health issue(s), mental health evidence is relevant to sentence 
mitigation. Implicit in the foregoing is that the mitigating nature of mental health issues 
should be amplified when there is a nexus between the underlying offense the 
defendant's mental health problems. Here, Mr. Grant's mental health issues were not 
addressed during his period of retained jurisdiction. (Tr., p.199, Ls.9-10.) In fact, 
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Mr. Grant did not list any mental health issues on his first guilty plea advisory form. 
(R. Vol. I, p.113.) On his second guilty plea advisory form, Mr. Grant listed Bi-polar 
disorder and post traumatic stress disorder. (R. Vol. II, p.256.) According to his trial 
counsel, Mr. Grant suffers from depression, bi-polar disorder, and post traumatic stress. 
(Tr., p.196, L.23 - p.197, L.2.) Trial counsel went on to argue that Mr. Grant was not on 
his medications for his mental health issues at the time of the offense, and that his 
medications have stabilized him since that time. (Tr. p.198, Ls.1-11.) Mr. Grant was 
not diagnosed with mental health issues when he committed the initial offense. He was 
not taking his medications when he committed the new offenses. According to his trial 
counsel when he is on his medications he stabilizes. Therefore, there is a possible 
nexus between Mr. Grant's mental health and the commission of the offense, which 
should be afforded amplified mitigating weight. 
Additionally, Mr. Grant's substance addiction is a mitigating factor. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has held that substance addiction should be considered as a mitigating 
factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 
89 (1982). Here, Mr. Grant first consumed alcohol and marijuana when he was twelve 
years old and methamphetamine when he was fourteen. (2006 PSI, p.1 0.) 
Mr. Grant has illustrated his plans to overcome his addiction and help other 
people who also suffer with addiction. Mr. Grant plans to attend college and become a 
substance addiction counselor. (2006 PSI, p.10.) The fact that Mr. Grant graduated 
from high school increases his chances of Mr. Grant's goal to attend college and 
become an addiction counselor. (2006 PSI, p.8.) While Mr. Grant was incarcerated 
and awaiting the disposition of his new offenses he attended the SHARE and 
successfully completed the inpatient portion of the SHARE program and helped other 
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inmates participate in that program. (01/21/10 Letter from Glenda Bellanca; Tr., p.19?, 
Ls.14-19; Tr., p.202, Ls.6-17.) Additionally, he volunteered in the "short stop" program, 
and shared his story with young people. (06/16/10 Letter from the Bannock County 
Sherriff, Lorin Nielsen; Tr., p.19?, Ls.20-25; Tr., p.202, Ls.18-24.) Mr. Grant's 
amenability to rehabilitation is supported by the outpatient treatment recommendation 
he received after completing his substance addiction elevation. (2010 PSI, p.43)5 
Mr. Grant has taken steps toward his rehabilitation and at the same time he has helped 
others in the past and plans to help people in the future. 
Additionally, Mr. Grant's childhood abuse is a mitigating factor. This Court has 
recognized exposure to abuse during a defendant's childhood as a mitigating factor. 
State v. Williams, 135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001). Mr. Grant grew up in a home 
where he was exposed to regular domestic violence. (2006 PSI, p.?) Mr. Grant was 
sexually abused by an uncle when he was a child. (PSI, p.?) 
The support Mr. Grant's receives from his friends and family is also a mitigating 
factor. In State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982), the Idaho Supreme Court noted 
that support of family and friends were mitigating factors. Despite his troubled 
childhood, Mr. Grant has a relationship with his parents and receives support from them 
and the rest of his family. (2006 PSI, pp.7-9.) There were various letters attached to 
the PSI, all of which indicate that Mr. Grant is a caring person who has support from his 
5 There are various attachments to the 2010 PSI. For ease of citation the 2010 PSI and 
the attachments have been numbered, beginning with the cover of the 2010 PSI and 
ending on page 43. 
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friends and family. (2006 PSI, pp.18-22l Mr. Grant received many support letters 
from his friends and family before his probation violation disposition hearing. 
Additionally, Mr. Grant has displayed remorse for his actions. In State v. Alberts, 
121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991), the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that some 
leniency is required when the defendant has expressed "remorse for his conduct, his 
recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other positive 
attributes of his character." Mr. Grant expressed remorse for his actions. (2006 PSI, 
p.5; 2010 PSI, p.5.) At sentencing, Mr. Grant apologized to the victim and her parents. 
(Tr. p.210, Ls.5-22.) 
Finally, Mr. Grant has proven he can succeed in treatment. Mr. Grant performed 
well while on his period of retained jurisdiction and ultimately received a probation 
recommendation. (Addendum to the Presentence Investigation (hereinafter, APSI)), 
p.5Y According to the APSI, Mr. Grant did not receive any formal or informal 
disciplinary warning. (APSI, p.3.) In the New Directions Program, Mr. Grant's peers 
recognized him for exceeding expectations on five occasions. (APSI, pA.) Mr. Grant 
received a reward card for his excellent performance while on a work crew and was an 
assistant in the computer lab. (APSI, p.g.) Mr. Grant also initiated the application 
process to attend Idaho State University. (APSI, p.10.) 
In sum, Mr. Grant has mental health issues which could have contributed to the 
commission of his offense. At the same time, Mr. Grant stabilizes when he takes his 
6 There are various attachments to the 2006 PSI. For ease of citation the 2006 PSI and 
the attachments have been numbered, beginning with the cover of the 2006 PSI and 
ending on page 22. 
7 There are various attachments to the APSI. For ease of citation the APSI and the 
attachments have been numbered, beginning with the cover of the APSI and ending on 
page 10. 
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medications. However, he was not on his medications when he committed his most 
recent offenses. If medicated, Mr. Grant poses a reduced risk to society. This pOint is 
supported by the fact that Mr. Grant has performed well while on his period of retained 
jurisdiction and while he was incarcerated awaiting his disposition of the new charges. 
When this is taken into consideration with the other mitigating factors it supports that 
conclusion that the district court abused its discretion by imposing and executing 
excessively harsh sentences. 
v. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Grant's Rule 35 Motion For 
A R~duction Of Sentence In Light Of Mr. Grant's Continuing Family Support 
A. Introduction 
The District Court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion for a 
reduction of his sentence, in light of the new information indicating that he has 
continuing family support. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Figueroa's Rule 35 
Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence In Light Of Mr. Grant's Continuing Family 
Support 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which 
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 
125 Idaho 251,253 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21 (Ct. App.1987) 
and State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447 (Ct. App. 1984)). "The criteria for examining rulings 
denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether 
the original sentence was reasonable." Id. (citing Lopez, 106 Idaho at 450,680 P.2d at 
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872). "If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later 
show that it is excessive in view of new or additional information presented with the 
motion for reduction. Id. (citing State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114 (Ct. App. 1991 ». 
In support of Rule 35 motion, Mr. Grant provided two support letters indicating 
that his family will continue to provide him support. In addition, his family also appeared 
at his Rule 35 hearing as a show of their support. (Tr., p.221, Ls.3-6.) Additionally, 
Mr. Grant wrote a letter indicating that his rehabilitation continued to progress during his 
period of post judgment incarceration. (September 23, Letter written by Mr. Grant.) 
When this new information is taken into consideration with the preceding 
mitigating factors, articulated in Argument IV, Section (8), it supports that conclusion 
that the district court imposed an unduly harsh sentence. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcript and 
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which 
arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Grant requests 
that this Court either remand this action to hold further proceedings regarding the 
inquiry into the breakdown in attorney client relationship or vacate his sentence and 
restore his trial rights. In the event, this Court determines that the district court erred in 
admitting the victim impact statement, Mr. Grant requests that this Court vacate his 
sentence and remand this matter to the district court. Alternatively, Mr. Grant requests 
that this Court order his sentences in the 2009 cases to run concurrently with his 
sentence in the 2006 case. 
DATED this 1st day of November, 2011. 
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